O
ver the last few decades, beginning with financial liberalization policies initiated in the 1980s, China's capital markets have expanded rapidly. Its stock markets, essentially nonexistent prior to December 1990, have grown to become the second largest in the world behind the United States, totaling nearly $9 trillion in market capitalization as of the end of 2017.
1 At the same time, even as recent changes to restrictions on foreign investment have provided offshore investors with new access to China's domestic stock markets, those considering an allocation to Chinese equities still face a range of challenges in allocating to the Chinese equity market. The relatively short market history often makes statistical analyses inconclusive, whereas the evolving and uncertain regulatory environment creates doubts regarding the relevance of historical data. Substantial differences in market microstructure, such as the retail investor participation rate, transactions costs, and market liquidity, also have a significant effect on the implementation and performance of traditional investment strategies applied to Chinese stocks.
With growing expectations for greater inclusion of Chinese stocks in global equity benchmarks, asset owners must assess whether 1 According to data from World Federation of Exchanges, 2018. standard approaches to generate excess equity returns are equally valid in China. The appeal of such cross-sectional factor strategies stems from lower direct costs for investment management and lower indirect costs associated with governance and due diligence. In a market in which uncertainty and nontransparency are high, such features are particularly compelling. As such, the principal aim of this study is to develop a better understanding of the degree to which anomalies from the literature on U.S. equity markets can be generalized to stocks in China. In other words, we seek to answer the following question:
What works and what does not when it comes to factor investing in China? As we will see, some well-known factors reliably carry over to Chinese stocks, but a number of other popular strategies do not, with some producing performance counter to that observed in the United States, underscoring the importance of this research for investors considering an allocation to Chinese equities.
Of course, our study is not the first to examine factor strategies applied to Chinese stocks. Within a few years of the country's mainland exchanges opening, academics began publishing replications of popular U.S. factor strategies in China. Unfortunately, the emerging literature on Chinese equity anomalies has yielded troublesome disparities, particularly with respect to the magnitude and significance of the premium SUMMER 2018 to a number of widely used factors, raising questions about the robustness of these results. These inconsistencies arise from the exceedingly short samples employed, combined with subtle differences in start/end dates, as well as variations in factor definitions from one paper to another. Our research will address many of these issues while reconciling apparent discrepancies in the existing literature where possible.
CHALLENGES TO FACTOR RESEARCH IN CHINA
A critical shortcoming of much prior research in this area is a failure on the part of many studies to recognize that evaluating factor strategies in Chinese equities requires more than constructing simple long-short portfolios and measuring historical average returns and associated t-statistics. Indeed, Cheung, Hoguet, and Ng [2014] pointed to a range of considerations that prevent investors from drawing straightforward conclusions from traditional quantitative analysis of Chinese stocks. For one, China's domestic equity market offers a very short sample of returns and accounting data. Those data that are available are subject to evolving reporting standards and punctuated by numerous changes in regulations and instances of government intervention. Further complicating matters, China's market is segmented into multiple share classes with varying levels of liquidity and strict constraints on ownership and trading. Short sales only became possible in 2010, and trading suspensions-in many cases imposed voluntarily by a firm's managersare a relatively common occurrence, negatively affecting price formation and market liquidity. Shareholder rights in China are also evolving, and high levels of state ownership have the potential to exacerbate corporate governance issues. Finally, given that retail investors account for 85% of all trades in the Chinese equity market, 2 the potentially biased behaviors of individual investors are likely to have a more important impact on Chinese stock returns and anomalies than one observes in developed markets. We will show that applying knowledge of distinctive features of the Chinese financial landscape leads to a better understanding of the differences between U.S. and Chinese factor returns.
2 See, for instance, Shen and Goh [2015] ; Hilliard and Zhang [2015] .
SOME BACKGROUND ON CHINESE A-SHARES
Before we examine factor strategies using Chinese equity data, it is useful to review the segmented structure of China's equity markets.
3 Chinese stocks trade on two mainland exchanges, the Shanghai Stock Exchange (SSE), typified by large, state-owned financial and industrial firms, and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE), located adjacent to Hong Kong, which lists a greater proportion of new-economy growth firms. Domestic equities consist of two share classes: A-shares, previously restricted to ownership by domestic investors, and B-shares, originally held exclusively by foreign investors. In addition to shares traded onshore, H-shares represent firms incorporated in China and listed in Hong Kong and a range of securities issued by Chinese firms both incorporated and listed overseas, including those in Hong Kong (called Red and P chips), Singapore (S chips), and the United States (N chips). For roughly the first decade of trading in Chinese stocks, because of the prohibition on foreigners holding A-shares, offshore investors seeking equity exposure to China's economy had no choice but to purchase unrestricted securities-B-shares, H-shares, and the chips-or to invest in the stock of non-Chinese multinational companies doing significant business in China. This changed in 2002, when China began its Qualified Foreign Institutional Investors (QFII) program, allowing foreign investors to invest directly in A-shares. The recent expansion of QFII quotas and the introduction of Stock Connect have contributed to an increased interest in Chinese A-shares among foreign investors, motivating our focus on A-shares in this study.
FACTOR INVESTING IN A-SHARES
As a prelude to the more detailed discussion of A-shares factor performance in the next section, Exhibit 1 reports A-shares and U.S. long-short factor returns associated with a broad range of stock characteristics corresponding to various dimensions of cross-sectional return predictability that have received significant attention in the U.S. equity anomalies literature. We test each strategy by first sorting A-shares and U.S. stocks into SUMMER 2018 Notes: The 
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( 1 26) 8 4%*** decile portfolios, then forming long-short portfolios by purchasing stocks in the top decile on each characteristic and shorting those in the bottom decile. To ensure we are working with stocks that are sufficiently liquid for investors to actually implement our strategies, our universe consists of the top 80% of stocks in each country based on market capitalization-all-but-tiny stocks, to use the language of Fama and French [2008] . We report returns to equal-and value-weighted versions of each factor. Rebalancing takes place annually or monthly, depending on the signal. We will describe the data and make a thorough analysis of results for each of the factors shortly. For now, we simply offer a few general observations that serve to motivate a more detailed discussion of the results.
Although our full-sample U.S. results largely line up with those in the literature, the performance of A-shares factor strategies since 1995 is something of a mixed bag. Much of this study will be concerned with rationalizing the similarities and differences between anomaly returns for A-shares and U.S. stocks based on a deep knowledge of the distinctive features of China's investing landscape with ramifications for factor investing. When evaluated over a more recent sample-using data beginning in 2008, which should be more representative of present market conditions after the major financial and accounting reforms we describe later-we obtain quite different results in some cases, illustrating the sensitivity of such tests to relatively short samples (we employ 22 years of data, at most, in our analysis of A-shares versus 52 years for U.S. stocks), and highlighting the effects that things such as evolving accounting standards and a changing regulatory environment might have on factor investing.
Over the shorter 2008-2016 sample, it is clear that the statistical significance of most results is substantially diminished. Similarly, although most of the well-known anomalies exhibit strong returns over the full sample in the United States (covering 1965-2016), when we evaluate those same U.S. factor returns over a simulated 10-year sample using data taken from each 10-year subperiod over the last five decades, the results are also less robust. This simple comparison offers an argument against a rush to conclude that a lack of significance necessarily implies the absence of an effect. Rather, it raises a question: If the history of Chinese data had as much time to unfurl as the U.S. sample, would A-shares factor returns compare more favorably with those observed in developed markets?
Investors contemplating an allocation to Chinese equities likely prefer not to wait another 30 years for a sample of sufficient size to yield higher t-statistics. In the meantime, we indicate in Exhibit 1 the number of years needed in our sample for each factor to attain statistical significance, assuming estimates from the short sample hold true going forward. For many U.S. signals calculated over the simulated short sample, the number of years necessary to achieve significance is no greater than the actual size of the full sample for U.S. stocks: around 50 years. On the other hand, it is interesting to note that in the case of the value factor, supposing all we had observed was a typical decade of returns, we likely would have spuriously concluded that an effect was absent for U.S. stocks.
What about for A-shares? The low-volatility effect is an interesting case. Based on estimates from our recent sample, we would need well upward of 200 years of data to achieve a decent p-value. It seems difficult to make the case that the lack of significance for the lowvolatility effect in China is based solely on the length of our recent sample. For other factors-accruals and net operating assets (NOA), valuation-based signals since 1995, or price-based signals in recent years-the required sample length is reasonably low, suggesting that with more data we might expect some of these factors to present with higher statistical confidence. The question as to whether we should expect estimated means and standard errors from our existing A-shares sample to persist in the future can only be answered through a closer examination of the theory underlying each anomaly's performance given our knowledge of Chinese equity markets. After all, the t-statistics may be low because the factors do not work, not because of a lack of statistical power.
Data
To evaluate factor strategies applied to Chinese equities, we collect returns and accounting variables for all A-shares stocks from the China Stock Market and Accounting Research (CSMAR) database. Because Chinese listed firms must report prior-year financial results before the end of April, we rebalance factors constructed using accounting variables annually, at the SUMMER 2018 beginning of May. 4 We collect stock returns and financial statements for firms in our sample from May 1995 through December 2016. To understand the choice of start date, it is important to note that although China's equity markets opened for trading in 1990, it is clear from Exhibit 2, which presents summary data on Chinese equity markets since inception, that only in the mid-1990s were there enough listed A-shares available to form factor portfolios of reasonable size for practical implementation. We employ an internally calculated investable market cap-weighted benchmark using all available A-shares stocks in CSMAR as our A-shares market benchmark, and our risk-free proxy is the Chinese 12-month deposit rate, which we obtain from CSMAR. For the sake of comparison, we collect U.S. stock returns and accounting data from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) and Compustat, respectively, beginning in January 1963 and ending in December 2016. We use data from Kenneth French's website for the U.S. market benchmark and risk-free rate. We rebalance annual strategies for the United States in July of each year. As mentioned before, we usually break out A-shares results using returns beginning in May 2008 to assess factor performance in a more recent sample. We split the data at this point in time because the previous few years saw major changes in both trading regulations and financial reporting standards that could bias results based on market and financial data from earlier years. In 2005, China's financial regulatory body, the China Securities Regulatory Commission, instituted the SplitShare Structure Reform to relax trading restrictions on shares of listed state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Prior to this reform, as Exhibit 2 indicates, roughly two-thirds of shares outstanding in the market for A-shares were held directly by the state or other government entities and could not be legally traded, resulting in lower liquidity and the obvious agency problems that arise when majority shareholders cannot benefit from an increasing share price (Beltratti, Bortolotti, and Caccavaio [2012] ). By 2007, however, most listed firms had completed the process of bringing previously nontradable shares to market, mitigating these problems for stocks in the later sample period. In February 2006, China's Ministry of Finance announced a new set of accounting standards requiring firms with listed A-shares to adopt, by 2007, accounting practices substantially conforming to International Financial Reporting Standards. These changes in accounting standards resulted in a lower incidence of accruals-based earnings management and higher-quality financial reports with more "value relevance" to investors (Ho, Liao, and Taylor [2015] ). Given these changes in the regulatory and reporting environment, we view 2007 as an important breakpoint in the data.
Factors
In Exhibit 3, we provide a list of various factors identified in prior research along with the associated characteristics we use to validate each factor's efficacy in A-shares. Predictors preceded by a minus sign are those variables hypothesized to have an inverse relationship with future stock returns; we transform these predictors such that corresponding high-minus-low trading strategies should, in theory, produce positive expected returns. In the last column, we indicate the rebalancing frequency for each predictor. We will describe each factor more fully in the course of presenting our results, and we offer full details on the calculation of all predictive characteristics, along with summary statistics and a brief literature review for each anomaly in the online supplement.
INDIVIDUAL FACTOR STRATEGIES

Value
Over the full sample, A-shares exhibit a strong value effect. Value-weighted returns associated with sorts on various valuation ratios range from 5.7% per year (dividend yield) to 11.7% per year (sales-to-price). The literature on value strategies in A-shares is somewhat divided, although most prior studies offer at least marginal evidence of a relationship between book-toprice ratios and future returns. 5 In terms of explaining these positive findings, Huang, Yang, and Zhang [2013] reported a strong book-to-price effect in A-shares, but they found that value stocks in China actually exhibited lower default risk than growth firms, contradicting the usual risk-based rationalization of the value premium. Given the observation by Ng and Wu [2006] that Chinese retail investors prefer holding growth stocks, a behavioral story seems plausible for those studies seeming to confirm the overvaluation of A-shares glamour stocks. Alternative specifications of the value strategy have received less attention, and the evidence that does exist on earnings-to-price, sales-to-price, and dividend-toprice ratios is less consistent. 6 Cheung, Hoguet, and Ng Hilliard and Zhang [2015] ; and Carpenter, Lu, and Whitelaw [2015] . Others offer results merely suggestive of bookto-market's predictability, including Wang and Xu [2004] ; Chen et al. [2010]; and Cheung, Hoguet, and Ng [2014] . Drew, Naughton, and Veeraraghavan [2003] , studying only firms on the Shanghai Stock Exchange, found that low book-to-market stocks outperform. 6 We have focused on explanations for significant findings on alternative versions of the value effect, but a number of papers in the literature reported the absence of such an effect. For example, Wang and Di Iorio [2007] tested for profits when sorting by cash-f lowto-price and dividend yield, but found none. Likewise, Chen et al. [2010] failed to detect any relationship between earnings-to-price or cash f low-to-price ratios and future returns.
[2014] found a positive dividend yield effect and suggested that China's taxation of dividends but not capital gains might result in investors demanding a premium to hold dividend-paying stocks. Eun and Huang [2007] reported a marginally significant positive relationship between earnings-to-price ratios and future returns but also observed a weakly significant negative relationship between dividend yield and future returns, contradicting the usual finding of a positive dividend yield effect. They asserted that investors might accept lower returns on dividend-paying stocks because payment of dividends signals that managers are willing to return capital to investors. Of course, if unsophisticated investors irrationally disregard the value of this signal, such an explanation could also apply as a behavioral story for a positive dividend yield (D/P) effect.
Turning to the more recent sample, we observe a substantially weaker value effect. This may stem, in part, from the sensitivity of value strategies to the 2008 global financial crisis, which kicks off our shorter A-shares sample. It is also possible that the diminishing performance in A-shares value strategies is related to the changes in accounting standards and the Split-Share Structure Reform that motivated our choice of 2007 as a breakpoint in our A-shares data. Liao, Liu, and Wang [2014] pointed out that prior to 2005, nontradable shares of SOEs were not valued at market prices but at the book value of a firm's assets. This gave majority shareholders a strong incentive to disregard tradable shareholder value and inf late the firm's balance sheet, which could easily lead to high book-to-market ratios for those firms exposing minority investors to the most risk. Such abuses are often cited as a principal reason for the eventual enactment of the Split-Share Structure Reform. Moreover, the accounting changes that took effect in 2007 resulted in an increase in the quality of financial reporting and greater reliance by investors on valuation measures calculated using data from firms' financial statements, which could also account for attenuation of the value effect in the post-2007 sample period (although, given that most A-shares turnover is due to trading by retail investors, there is good reason for skepticism about such rational explanations for a diminished value effect in recent years).
Size
We find a very strong size effect in A-shares. An investor buying the smallest stocks and shorting the SUMMER 2018 largest firms produced value-weighted returns of 14.6% per year over the two decades covered by our analysis, results that are significant at the 5% level. Over the shorter sample beginning in 2008, the size anomaly produced even stronger performance, with a valueweighted size factor returning almost 25% per annum. Our finding with respect to firm size is consistent with past work on predictability in A-shares, with almost all studies of factor strategies confirming a size effect in Chinese stocks, regardless of the sample period. What might account for the outperformance of small stocks in Chinese A-shares? Investigating the size effect prior to China's 2005 Split-Share Structure Reform, Wang and Xu [2004] calculated firm size using only tradable shares (we use total shares outstanding) and concluded that part of the size effect in the pre-reform years might relate to agency issues because small firms were more likely to have large blocks of nontradable shares, leading to less favorable corporate governance, for which rational investors should demand higher returns. Given that our recent sample covers a period in which this split-share structure no longer applies, the same rationale cannot explain those results. Huang, Yang, and Zhang [2013] proposed another risk-based explanation for the size effect. Estimating default probabilities for A-shares in a manner similar to that used by Ohlson [1980] , they found that size is highly correlated with default risk and that controlling for default risk eliminated some-but not all-of the ability that size has to predict future returns. Thus, at least some of the size premium might be attributable, as Fama and French [1993] suggested, to compensation for risk. Assuming size proxies for distress risk, Huang, Yang, and Zhang [2013] suggested one more reason why we might observe higher returns for financially distressed A-shares firms. Because qualifying for an initial public 7 Prior studies documenting a size effect in A-shares include those by Drew, Naughton, and Veeraraghavan [2003] offering (IPO) in China has been historically difficult, many firms seeking external financing in the equity markets find it easier to merge with a firm on the verge of delisting, resulting in distressed companies often having substantial shell value as candidates for reverse mergers. A common behavioral story for the size effect is that unsophisticated investors exhibit an irrational demand for large-cap stocks and drive the price of large stocks too high. Ng and Wu [2006] , analyzing data from Chinese brokerage accounts, reported that retail investors actually prefer small company stocks (they theorize that small growth stocks are more attractive to investors with little capital and an inability to use leverage), contradicting this explanation in the case of A-shares.
Having identified a statistically significant pattern in the cross section of stock returns, there is still a question as to whether the outperformance of size in A-shares might have led to inf lation in the valuation of stocks on the long side of the factor portfolio. If so, a correction in prices would likely yield less stellar future returns, in which case we should be particularly wary about extrapolating the results of a favorable backtest. Indeed, it turns out much of the observed outperformance of small firms over our recent sample is accounted for by price-to-book inf lation in small-cap stocks, such that by the end of our sample, with an aggregate price-to-book ratio of 3.1, small-cap stocks seemed expensive relative to largecaps, whose ratio was only 1.1 (more details are given in the online supplement). These findings might lead a valuation-conscious investor to discount the A-shares size premium going forward. It is worth noting that the observed inf lation in valuation ratios for small-cap firms is consistent with the preference of retail investors for small-company stocks mentioned previously, supporting a behavioral explanation for the run-up in small-cap Chinese stocks in recent years.
Momentum/Reversal
Turning to technical factors based on sorts of stocks according to past returns, we find that the traditional intermediate-horizon momentum strategy fails for Chinese stocks, producing insignificant negative returns in the full sample period. At the same time, a factor trading on short-term reversal produces an equalweighted return of 8.3% per year in the full sample, significant at the 5% level, whereas long-term reversal yields a marginally significant equal-weighted return SUMMER 2018 of 8.5% per annum and a statistically significant valueweighted return of around 12% per year. 8 Our results on price-based factors are even more pronounced in the recent sample from 2008. Over that horizon, 12-month momentum produces negative returns of roughly 8% -12% per year, with t-statistics that suggest these results should be significant if they persist over a moderately longer sample. The short-term reversal factor is extremely profitable in recent years, generating returns of over 20% per annum in our backtests; long-term reversals post returns of 6% -8% per year since 2008. Taken together, these results indicate the presence of return reversals over all horizons in Chinese A-shares. On the other hand, implementing a price-based factor in A-shares can be costly because of the frequent trading required by such strategies, with annualized two-way turnover approaching 1,000% for momentum and exceeding 2,000% for short-term reversal (we provide full turnover data for each factor in the online supplement).
The literature largely confirms our findings on returns-based strategies, although there are a handful of exceptions.
9 Given the extremely high turnover exhibited by A-shares-Eun and Huang [2007] calculated average annual turnover in excess of 480% from 1991 through 2004, and Chen et al. [2007] reported that Chinese retail investors trade stocks almost four times more frequently than U.S. investors-it seems plausible that cycles of overreaction and correction might take place over shorter horizons in China, and this seems to be the usual explanation given by authors in the A-shares literature for the lack of a momentum effect. Of course, the same volatility that impairs mediumterm momentum should facilitate strategies based 8 Because our long-term reversal signal uses three years of past returns, we begin employing this signal in 1996, when enough price data become available.
9 Studies finding no momentum effect include those by Wang [2004] ; Wong, Tan, and Liu [2006] ; Chen et al. [2010] ; Chui, Titman, and Wei [2010] ; Li, Qiu, and Wu [2010] ; Wu [2011b]; and Cheung, Hoguet, and Ng [2014] . Other studies report some evidence of significant medium-term momentum in A-shares returns, including those by Kang, Liu, and Ni [2002] ; Naughton, Truong, and Veeraraghavan [2008] ; Cakici, Chan, and Topyan [2015] ; and Carpenter, Lu, and Whitelaw [2015] . Studies showing profits to short-term reversals include those by Kang, Liu, and Ni [2002] ; Li, Qiu, and Wu [2010] ; Wu [2011b] ; Cakici, Chan, and Topyan [2015] ; and Carpenter, Lu, and Whitelaw [2015] . Finally, Wang [2004] found some evidence of reversals at longer horizons. on short-term reversals, explaining the effectiveness of short-horizon strategies in Chinese A-shares. In a more comprehensive analysis of price-based strategies in A-shares (provided in the online supplement), we found reversals over literally every specification tested, sorting stocks based on past returns ranging from 1 to 12 months and over holding periods of up to one year. It is interesting to note that because returns to reversals persist for at least 12 months following portfolio formation, A-shares reversal strategies might be feasible even when rebalanced at lower frequencies.
In trying to better understand the results described, it is worth noting that investor behavior might also account for at least part of the difference in price-based strategies evaluated for A-shares and U.S. stocks. Arkes et al. [2010] found that Asian subjects adapt to prior gains and losses more quickly than their U.S. counterparts, which is consistent with reversals, but not momentum. In support of this story, Chinese individual investors' portfolio holdings do not seem to map well to momentum strategies (Ng and Wu [2006] ). Chui, Titman, and Wei [2010] proposed an alternative explanation on psychological grounds for cross-country differences in the effectiveness of returns-based strategies, citing evidence of cultural differences in individualism, a quality related to overconfidence and self-attribution bias, both of which have been implicated in behavioral models of momentum and reversals (e.g., Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam [1998] ). They found that the individualism of a country's population is positively correlated with momentum profits in the country's stock markets and weakly associated with the profitability of long-term price reversals. As expected, given China's classification as a relatively collectivist culture, the authors found no momentum effect for A-shares.
Low Volatility
We test for risk-based anomalies in A-shares on the basis of three measures of the volatility in past stock returns. The results in Exhibit 1 suggest that over the full sample period, higher risk-whether systematic or firm specific-predicts lower future returns for A-shares. Our finding that beta correlates negatively with future performance deviates from most studies testing the capital asset pricing model for Chinese stocks, which almost uniformly failed to identify a significant low-beta SUMMER 2018 effect for A-shares.
10 With respect to other measures of risk, Drew, Naughton, and Veeraraghavan [2004] documented an idiosyncratic volatility effect, whereas Eun and Huang [2007] and Cakici, Chan, and Topyan [2015] provided strong evidence of outperformance for stocks with both low idiosyncratic and low total volatility; Chen et al. [2010] reported only a weakly significant idiosyncratic volatility effect.
Our findings for Chinese stocks are particularly hard to square with rational models of risk and return. Eun and Huang [2007] posited that because most Chinese retail investors are grossly underdiversified-an observation borne out in the analysis of Chen et al. [2007] , who found that individual investors in China hold, on average, portfolios consisting of only 2.6 stocks-they should, as the model of Merton [1987] suggests, rationally earn a premium for bearing firmspecific risk, although the data suggest they actually pay a higher price for stocks with high idiosyncratic risk. The authors cited small investment account balances, the lack of a developed mutual fund industry, and the speculative nature of retail investors' trading activity as contributing to the concentration in Chinese individual investors' portfolios. The massive size of retail investor holdings and state ownership relative to shares held by institutional investors also makes the usual explanation for the low-beta effect, based on leverage-constrained mutual fund managers (Black [1972] ), less plausible. A more likely explanation seems to be a demand on the part of Chinese retail investors for stocks with lotterylike payoffs, which pushes the prices of risky stocks too high; Ng and Wu [2006] found that individual investors do tend to hold a greater proportion of risky shares, in support of this story.
Accruals/NOA
We employ two common measures of earnings quality and sustainability: total accruals and NOA. 11 10 See, for example, Wang and Xu [2004] ; Wong, Tan, and Liu [2006] ; Eun and Huang [2007] ; Wang and Di Iorio [2007] ; Cheung, Hoguet, and Ng [2014] ; Cakici, Chan, and Topyan [2015] ; and Carpenter, Lu, and Whitelaw [2015] .
11 As our measure of accounting accruals, we employ total accruals, as defined by Hribar and Collins [2002] , using information from the cash f low statement; as such, our accruals signal begins in 2000, when these data are available from CSMAR. Following the accruals literature, we exclude financial firms, for which earnings In his seminal study of the accrual effect, Sloan [1996] pointed to unsophisticated investors' failure to account for earnings management as an important driver of profits to the accruals strategy. Because it seems unlikely that Chinese retail investors will fare any better than U.S. institutions in gauging the effects of accounting manipulation on the persistence of firms' cash f lows, high retail investor participation in Chinese equities implies that the efficacy of A-shares strategies based on accounting conservatism will depend largely on whether Chinese firms manage earnings. Initial evidence on this question comes from a cross-country analysis by Leuz, Nanda, and Wysocki [2003] , who showed earnings management is more pronounced in nations with less developed financial markets. Indeed, many studies in the academic accounting literature identify earnings management as a significant concern in China (e.g., Aharony, Lee, and Wong [2000] ; Chen and Yuan [2004] ; Jian and Wong [2010] ).
As Exhibit 4 illustrates, the extent of earnings management in China is visibly apparent in the distribution of firms' earnings, which rarely go negative. The stark discontinuity at ROE = 0% suggests a strong preference on the part of Chinese firms to report small gains as opposed to small losses. Reported earnings in the United States, by contrast, exhibit something closer to normality, although they still show a slight kink around breakeven earnings, suggesting at least some degree of earnings management by U.S. firms. Given clear evidence of earnings management by Chinese firms, even before running a backtest, we would expect A-shares factors based on accounting conservatism to be particularly effective. As expected, the results in Exhibit 1 indicate that high accruals predict lower future stock returns in both the full and recent sample periods; judging by the t-statistics, performance of accruals is somewhat weaker in the post-2007 sample, possibly because of China's 2006 accounting reforms, which, as mentioned before, seem to have contributed to a reduction in accruals-based earnings management management is likely to take a fundamentally different form than it does in other industries. Given massive IPO underpricing in A-shares- Tian [2011] reported average first-day returns of 247% for offerings conducted from 1992 to 2007-we also drop firmyear observations in which a firm first issued shares. In the United States, because the cash f low statement is only available after 1987, we report accruals following Sloan [1996] , who used information from the balance sheet.
SUMMER 2018 (Ho, Liao, and Taylor [2015] ). NOA provides marginally significant performance in both sample periods.
Few past studies have examined factors based on accounting conservatism in A-shares. Chen et al. [2010] also tested both accruals and NOA factors; they found weak evidence of an inverse relationship between accruals and future stock performance but strong support for the use of an A-shares NOA factor. On the other hand, Pincus, Rajgopal, and Venkatachalam [2007] , in a study of the accrual effect in global markets-including Hong Kong and Taiwan, but omitting A-shares-found the accruals anomaly appears to be stronger in markets 
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governed by common law, including those in Hong Kong and the United States, than in markets governed by code law, like those in Taiwan and mainland China, which could account for the fact that we do not observe a greater accrual effect in A-shares.
Investments
Over the full sample period, we find little support for the asset growth anomaly-the notion that growth in a firm's balance sheet predicts lower future returns-as neither ΔASSET nor ΔBOOK succeed in differentiating between good and bad stocks. That said, results in more recent years indicate a strong effect, particularly when employed in a value-weighted strategy, in which both asset growth signals generate nearly 9% per annum in outperformance. What factors might explain these seemingly conf licting results? If empire building by U.S. executives results in a negative relationship between asset growth and firm value, as Titman, Wei, and Xie [2004] suggested, we might view the absence of such an effect in A-shares as evidence Chinese managers are not similarly engaged in expanding the firm's balance sheet for personal benefit. On the other hand, given managers of SOEs are subject to a policy burden that entails pursuing political and social objectives beyond maximizing shareholder value-promoting greater employment, for example-it seems more reasonable to assume, ex ante, that overinvestment is a very serious risk for Chinese firms. As Exhibit 5 illustrates, SOEs do seem to exhibit behavior typical of firms undertaking inefficient investment; state-owned companies show higher levels of debt issuance (consistent with SOEs having easier access to loans from state-owned banks) and significantly lower efficiency in employing those assets than non-SOEs. These effects appear particularly pronounced after the global financial crisis, which would account for a stronger asset growth effect in the recent sample. Past studies focusing on the operating performance of SOEs relative to private listed firms in China strongly support this view (e.g., Wu, Wu, and Rui [2010] ; Chen et al. [2011] ; ).
Checking in with the literature, one finds mixed evidence on the asset growth effect in A-shares. Titman, Wei, and Xie [2013] analyzed data covering the period from 2000 through 2010 and found no significant relationship between total asset growth and future stock returns in China (if anything, returns in their sample appeared to be higher for stocks with greater asset growth, although those results were not statistically significant). Analyzing a range of other countries, they concluded the asset growth effect is most pronounced in countries with more developed financial markets, and the strength of the effect seems to have little relation to corporate governance or trading costs-all factors that should suggest against finding a straightforward relationship between asset growth and returns in Chinese markets. Watanabe et al. [2013] obtained similar results over a longer sample, covering 1990-2010.
By contrast, Yao et al. [2011] documented a significant relationship between total asset growth and stock returns for A-shares stocks from 1994 through 2007; in a cross-country analysis, however, they confirmed the effect is generally weaker in countries with more homogeneous asset growth rates and a greater reliance on bank financing, both of which apply in the case of Chinese firms. The strongest evidence for an asset growth effect in A-shares comes from Wang et al. [2015] , who reported that the effect is most prevalent for state-owned firms and companies with high cash f lows and low debt. These conclusions are more consistent with evidence of SOE overinvestment and correspond most closely with our backtest over the more recent sample. Large SOEs will certainly exert a greater impact on the factor returns in Exhibit 1, given our universe of relatively large Chinese firms-particularly our value-weighted specifications, which show the greatest investment effect.
Profitability
Our evidence for a gross profitability effect in A-shares-whereby more profitable companies should outperform less profitable firms-is quite weak. A related signal based on operating profitability is even less effective in China; in the more recent sample period, the operating profitability (OP) signal actually yields returns with the wrong sign. These outcomes are roughly consistent with work by Sun, Wei, and Xie [2014] , who reported that gross profitability fails to predict future stock returns in China from 1994 through 2009. Examining gross profitability around the world, the authors found that the effect tends to be strongest in developed countries, countries with low levels of political risk, and countries in which firms enjoy easier access to investment capital, providing a rationale for the absence of a significant effect in our A-shares sample. The authors' cross-country analysis also revealed that returns to gross profitability are not greater in countries with more severe limits to arbitrage-contrary to the prediction of theories associating the gross profitability effect with mispricing-further weakening the case for observing a significant effect in China, where short sale constraints and high idiosyncratic volatility should, in principal, make mispricing riskier to exploit, leading to higher returns for strategies based on behavioral effects. On the other hand, although the predictive value of gross profitability is weak in our sample of Chinese stocks, if profitability factor returns bear low correlation to those based on other signals we have investigated, profitability might still serve as a useful addition to a multifactor A-shares strategy. Indeed, in his original study of the gross profitability effect in the United States, Novy-Marx [2013] demonstrated that one of the principal benefits of a long-short factor based on gross profitability is the complementary nature of the strategy with respect to a traditional value factor; over his study's sample period of 1963-2010, gross profitability and value factor returns actually had a correlation of −0.57. In light of this finding, and because firms ranking favorably on gross profitability tend to have high price-to-book ratios, we might view gross profitability as a way of identifying "good" growth firms. We find that the correlations between A-shares value and profitability factors are quite low; in our data, gross profitability and bookto-price have a coefficient of −0.52, which is essentially identical to what Novy-Marx [2013] observed for U.S. stocks, supporting profitability-based signals as part of a diversified A-shares factor strategy.
CONCLUSIONS
This study set out to determine whether equity factors commonly employed by investors in other markets might be applied in devising profitable investment strategies for Chinese A-shares. We systematically tested a diverse set of factors against a carefully constructed sample of stock returns and accounting data covering the last two decades of activity in Chinese equity markets. We identified a number of strategies that carry over quite well from U.S. stocks to A-shares, but found that several traditional factors yielded surprising results when applied to Chinese stocks. Along the way, we addressed the range of challenges facing researchers studying quantitative investment strategies in A-shares and attempted to better understand deviations from the U.S. experience on the basis of features we believe make China's investing landscape unique. Beyond yielding specific insights into factor performance in A-shares, our analysis underscores two important considerations for researchers and investors studying Chinese stocks. First, we note that naïve application of U.S. strategies to Chinese stocks may lead to undesirable results because not all strategies familiar to U.S. investors outperform in A-shares, and-even worse-some actually work in the opposite direction. Moreover, our work suggests that a thoughtful approach to factor design and portfolio construction based on knowledge specific to A-shares and the related financial landscape has the potential to produce superior outcomes for investors.
